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PLEA BARGAINING REEXAMINED 
Lynn, M. Mather*t 
PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, 
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS. By Milton Heumann. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press. 1978. Pp. vii, 220. $15.00. 
That relatively few criminal cases in this country are re-
solved by full Perry Mason-style trials is fairly common knowl-
edge. Most cases are settled by a guilty plea after some form of 
negotiation over the charge or sentence. But why? The standard 
explanation is case pressure: the enormous volume of criminal 
cases, to be processed with limited staff, time, and resources, 
forces prosecutors and defense attorneys to abandon full-scale 
adversary trials in favor of rapid, expedient plea negotiations. 
Abraham Blumberg expressed the conventional wisdom in 1967 
in his widely read book, Criminal Justice. Blumberg argued that 
a "bureaucratic due process" has emerged to cope with the 
"onerously large case loads" that overwhelm the cumbersome 
and time-consuming adversary process.1 This case-pressure ex-
planation has dominated the literature on plea bargaining. 
But a large body of new empirical research now demands 
that we re-examine plea negotiation.2 Milton Heumann's book, 
Plea Bargaining, strongly and explicitly attacks the case-pressure 
argument and suggests an alternative explanation for plea bar-
gaining based on the adaptation of attorneys and judges to the 
local criminal court. The book is a significant and welcome addi-
tion to the literature. Heumann's investigation of case pressure 
and plea negotiation demonstrates solid research and careful 
analysis. The book's focus on adaptation also provides original 
data on the socialization of lawyers and judges, and introduces 
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1. A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21 (1967). 
2. See A. RosETI & D. CRESSEY, JusncE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN 
COURTHOUSE (1976); J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, F'ELoNY JusncE: AN ORGANIZA'l10NALANALY• 
SIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); M. LEVIN, URBAN POIJTICS AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); 
L. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL CASE D1sPosmoN (1979); 
M. Feeley, The Effects of Heavy Caseloads (1975) (paper delivered at the 1975 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco). These studies, as 
well as the book under review, provide explanations for plea bargaining which are not 
based on case pressure. 
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important considerations for further research on local criminal 
courts. 
Heumann studied-plea bargaining in three cities in Connecti-
cut. He did field research (extensive interviewing and observa-
tion) at both the circuit court and superior court in each city, and 
he collectetl historical data on criminal case disposition for the 
Connecticut superior courts. Heumann first tests the case-
pressure argument by examining the rate of trials over time. He 
found that, at least as far back as 1880, adversary trial was not 
the dominant mode of felony case disposition in Connecticut; the 
mean percentage of cases resolved by trial over a seventy-five-
year period was 8.7%. Further, there was little difference in the 
trial rates of the most and least busy courts, especially after 1910. 
These findings comport with other recent research on the history 
of the guilty plea.3 Moley's 1929 study also detailed the decrease 
in jury trials and noted as well that "[t]he tendency to plead 
guilty ... is not a condition peculiar to·large urban communi-
ties. It is just as evident in rural counties."' 
Heumann further tests the relationship between case pres-
sure and plea bargaining by looking at ·the rate of trials after 
Connecticut's recent jurisdictional change, which shifted a large 
portion of the case load of the superior courts to lower courts. In 
Connecticut's three bt!siest superior courts between 1970-1971 
and 1972-1973, "case pressure was roughly halved and personnel 
levels remained constant, but the rate of trials stayed the same; 
it did not increase appreciably as the decreased case pressure-
increased trials relationship would have predicted" (p. 30). 
If heavy case load is not the main impetus behind plea bar-
gaining, then what is? Why are criminal cases typically settled 
by guilty pleas, instead of full trials? Heumann's answer lies in 
his study of the transformation of "idealistic newcomers" to the 
criminal court into "seasoned plea bargainers." What happens to 
the newcomer during his first year of experience with criminal 
cases? 
He learns that the reality of the local criminal court differs from 
what he expected, and that compelling reasons to negotiate cases 
are often a product of this "reality"; he also is taught by rewards 
3. See L. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective; A. Alschuler, Plea 
Bargaining and its History (both papers presented at the Special National Workshop on 
Plea Bargaining, French Lick, Indiana, June 15-17, 1978) (revised versions of these papers 
forthcoming in LAw & Socv. REv. (Winter 1979)). 
4. R. MoLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 159 (1929), 
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and sanctions that benefits are attached to plea bargaining and 
that costs may be levied for a trial. [P. 154] 
A valuable contribution of this book is its careful and de-
tailed description of the criminal court "reality" that newcomers 
learn about. Inattention to this "reality" has led more than a few 
academic commentators (especially those in law reviews) to mis-
understand and misinterpret the criminal court process. First, 
participants in that process learn that, contrary to their expecta-
tions, most defendants are, in fact, guilty. Perry Mason's clients 
may be innocent, but most real-life defendants are not. Experi-
enced defense attorneys in Connecticut estimated that ninety 
percent of their clients are guilty; defense attorneys in Los Ange-
les· used the same figure in estimating the culpability of their 
clients.5 
A second lesson, one also quite different from the new attor-
ney's expectation, is that most cases have no disputable legal 
issues. Newcomers learn that most defendants are legally, as well 
as factually, guilty. In Los Angeles, cases with a high chance of 
conviction are commonly called "dead bang" cases; a defense 
attorney in Connecticut describes them as "born dead" (p. 60). 
The defense attorney learns the difficulty of winning at jury trial 
with a "dead bang" case. This lesson is true independently of any 
sanctions imposed for proceeding to an adversary trial, and it 
helps explain the frequency of the guilty plea. Indeed, the histori-
cal increase in guilty pleas in the late nineteenth century may be 
partially explained by the rise of professional police and prosecu-
tors. 6 
Third, newcomers learn that the most problematic issue in 
the criminal court is sentencing: what should be done with guilty 
offenders? Prosecutors, in particular, learn to distinguish be-
tween serious and nonserious cases and between cases with defen-
dants who should be incarcerated and those without. Under-
standing the degrees of seriousness and how to evaluate "what a 
case is worth" is crucial to understanding the dynamics of plea 
bargaining. Prosecutors do not believe that all cases deserve the 
full prosecution and full punishment prescribed by the penal stat-
utes. Thus, participants in the criminal process learn that, for the 
purpose of decidfng issues of punishment, one must attend to 
facts other than the formal charges-facts such as the degree of 
5. Attorneys in Los Angeles quoted this figure to me during my field research on 
felony plea bargaining there in 1970-1971. For a description of my research, see L, MATHER, 
supra note 2, at 7-10. 
6. See L. Friedman, supra note 3, at 21-23. 
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harm done, the relationship between the defendant and the vic-
tim, the amount of violence, and the defendant's record. 
Heumann does not develop the concept of "substantial jus-
tice," but the phrase appears in his interviews; for example, one 
prosecutor explained that "you need to look for justice tempered 
with mercy, you know, substantial justice, and that's what I do 
now" (p. 104).7 Other plea bargaining studies have suggested that 
plea negotiation may involve a genuine pursuit by the lawyers 
and the judge of "substantive justice.''8 As Utz ·argues, "plea 
bargaining is best understood as an adaptive process in which 
prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge attempt to rationalize the 
penal code and infuse a sense of realism in the implementation 
of absurdly excessive rules and procedures.''9 One way court 
personnel may moderate the criminal law is to reduce the statu-
torily prescribed penalties for particular offenders or for certain 
kinds of offenses. Thus, the rapid "no time" dispositions of 
"nonserious" cases (described by Heumann) may simply rep-
resent the judgment by courthouse professionals that harsh jail 
sentences are inappropriate for the problems presented in these 
cases. On the other hand, the pressure of scarce resources may 
also be at work here: the limited number of jail and prison cells 
demands that prosecutors and judges set priorities so that penal 
"time" is reserved for truly "serious" criminals. · 
Some of the lessons in this transformation, Heumann con-
tends, newcomers learn on their own merely by discovering cer-
tain facts about criminal cases. Other lessons are more actively 
taught newcomers by other participants in the criminal justice 
process. Although both the lessons taught and those learned con-
tribute to the frequency of plea bargaining, it is the latter, Heu-
mann suggests, which lie "at the heart of newcomer adaptation" 
(p. 3) and which most spur plea bargaining. 
Specifically, newcomers are taught, as Heumann explains, 
the rewards of plea bargaining and the sanctions attached to the 
adversarial approach. Most important, they are taught that the 
7. Although Heumann does not say as much, his interviewee might have meant by 
"substantial justice" what Utz and others mean by "substantive justice." See note 8 infra. 
8. The phrase "substantive justice" in the context of plea negotiation is used espe-
cially in P. Urz, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT 
(1978). See also A. RosETT & D. CRESSEY, supra note 2; L. MATHER, supra note 2. 
Clearly there are abuses in plea negotiation (in individual cases or even in the bar-
gaining patterns for an entire court) such that other factors (e.g., administrative expe-
diency, an attorney's fee interest, gamesmanship) may outweigh a concern for substantive 
justice. The point is that substantive justice must also be considered. 
9. P. Urz, supra note 8, at 139. 
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defendant who pleads guilty will be rewarded by a more lenient 
sentence or reduced charges, and, conversely, that the defendant 
who insists on a trial and is convicted will be penalized by a 
harsher sentence. This differential sentencing occurs primarily 
where defendants (or their lawyers) insist on motions or trials in 
the absence of realistically contesta:ble issues of fact or law. 
Judges and prosecutors in Connecticut consider formal, adver-
sarial tactics on behalf of obviously guilty defendants unaccepta-
ble behavior. Such behavior is sanctioned by the sentencing 'pen-
alty for defendants and by the prosecutor's denial of information 
("closing the files") and refusal to negotiate with attorneys who 
take formal, adversary positions. 
Heumann's book provides a thoughtful, well-supported anal-
ysis of the adaptation of newcomers to plea bargaining in one 
area. The book is not without its shortcomings, however. One 
problem is the combining of material on the adaptation to circuit 
courts and superior courts. Heumann virtually ignores the differ-
ences between the adaptation of defense attorneys, prosecutors, 
and judges in the two courts. And yet, in chapter 3, he distin-
guishes plea bargaining in the two courts both in style and sub-
stance. The process of adaptation may be the same in both 
courts, but Heumann should have attended more closely to differ-
ences in the content of the learning process (that is, what new-
comers learned and were taught) that produced the different plea 
bargaining systems of the lower and higher courts. 
Additionally, the differences between circuit and superior 
court plea bargaining are themselves not very clear. Defense at-
torneys in the circuit court (which handles misdemeanors and 
felonies punishable by up to five years in prison) sometimes use 
extensive "hustling" and gamesmanship to arrange case disposi-
tions. But in the ~uperior court, 
[p]ure hustling, slaps on the back, and so on, do not lead to an 
appreciably different result in sentencing. Certainly, a good rap-
port with the state's attorney does not inhibit the resolution pro-
cess, but the facts of the case and the legal questions outstanding 
cannot be treated lightly, no matter how close the personal rela-
tionship. [P. 43]. 
Nevertheless, after detailing these differences, Heumann con-
cludes the chapter by saying that "[t]he pandemonium of the 
circuit court suggests that justice is meted out whimsically; the 
calm of the superior court does not necessarily mean that the 
process is different there" (p. 46). Is the process different, then, 
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or not? I wish that :Heumann had addressed this issue more forth..: 
rightly. 10 
Another weakness in the book is Heumann's insufficient at-
tention to organizational and structural variables which might 
influence newcomers' adaptation. To understand the social learn-
ing of newt:omers in the criminal court, one should have more 
information on the recruitment process and the constraints on 
particular jobs. Heumann mentions Connecticut's unusual sys-
tem, in which judges appoint all prosecutors and public defend-
ers. How does this recruitment operate and what are the criteria 
for selection? What are the typical career patterns for prosecutors 
and public defenders? How are questions of salary, promotion, 
and staffing resolved? On the last page of the book, Heumann 
offers one very interesting footnote (p. 206 n.38) about the politi-
cal nature of recruitment for circuit court jobs. This could have 
been incorporated into the text and greatly expanded. More ma-
terial on the organizational and political context of the courts 
would have enriched Heumann's discussion of adaptation, as well 
as laid a stronger foundation for others to do comparative re-
search on plea bargaining. 
Plea bargaining is not the same in all criminal courts, and 
social scientists must attend to, and explain, this variation. Heu-
mann's findings are, at once, similar to and yet somewhat differ-
ent from my own findings on the dynamics offelony plea bargain-
ing in Los Angeles.11 Newcomers t.o the superior court in Los 
Angeles, just as in Connecticut, learn that the characteristics of 
criminal cases are contrary to their expectations. They learn 
about the culpability of most defendants, the infrequency of dis-
putable legal issues, and the need to sort cases according to seri-
ousness. They also learn about the importance of sentencing, the 
value of certainty in disposition, and the unpredictability of ju-
ries. However, differences in the rewards and sanctions and dif-
ferences in structural variables between Los Angeles and Con-
necticut have led to different plea bargaining systems. 
10. Any attempt to pursue these differences is further frustrated by the fact that the 
attorneys and judges quoted in later chapters are generally not identified by their associa-
tion with either the circuit or the superior court. 
11. I conducted field research on plea bargaining in the Los Angeles Superior Court 
(Central District) in 1970-1971. My research, like Heumann's, concentrated on the infor-
mal norms governing plea bargaining, although I did not look specifically at the process 
by which those norms were learned. See L. MATHER, supra note 2; Mather, Some Determi-
nants of the Method of Case Disposition: Decision-Making by Public Defenders in Los 
Angeles, 8 LAw & Socv. REv. 187 (1974). 
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For example, at the time of my research, felony dispositions 
in Los Angeles were much more formal and adversarial than those 
Heumann describes for Connecticut. Pretrial motions were com-
mon in Los Angeles and generally occurred without regard to any 
plea negotiations. Defense attorneys in Los Angeles, unlike those 
in Connecticut, did not perceive that clients were penalized in 
sentencing because of these formal motions (even where no 
"disputable" issue existed). Additionally, prosecutors in Los 
Angeles did not "close the files" to attorneys who insisted on 
filing pretrial motions. 
Also, many more cases were resolved by full adversary trial 
in Los Angeles Superior Court than in Connecticut. Only 3.8% of 
all felony cases in Connecticut Superior Courts in 1972-1973 were 
resolved by full trial (p. 27), compared to 11.6% of all felonies in 
Los Angeles Superior Court (in 1970) and over 22% of the more 
serious felonies (robbery, rape, other sex offenses, murder, kid-
napping).12 Under California's old indeterminate-sentencing law, 
the trial judge could not set the actual length of the prison term 
for felons committed to the state prison. In many serious cases, 
then, where the defense attorney could not negotiate a disposition 
that kept his client out of state prison, the case would go to trial. 
The defendant often had nothing to lose by doing so, and he just 
might be acquitted. Interestingly, with California's return to de-
terminate sentencing (in 1977), we may now expect to see fewer 
full trials in Los Angeles. Where attorneys can negotiate for defi-
nite time, conviction by trial poses clear sentencing risks. 
Another reason for the greater frequency of trials in Los An-
geles was that defense attorneys did not believe that their clients 
would be penalized in sentencing for conviction by trial in a 
"light" case (for example, where the defendant had little or no 
prior record and was charged with a minor offense). Prosecutors 
took little interest in the sentencing of "light" cases; the pre-
sentence investigation and the judge almost wholly determined 
sentencing. Also, bureaucratic constraints in the District Attor-
ney's office in Los Angeles restricted the deputy prosecutors' abil-
ity to reduce or dismiss weak cases. Thus, "light" cases, which 
were weak for the prosecution, were often resolved by adversary 
trial. In contrast, .prosecutors in Connecticut had full discretion 
12. Mather, supra note 11, at 213. One reason for the greater frequency of formal, 
adversarial behavior was the strength and independence of the public defender's office in 
Los Angeles. (E.g., public defenders in Los Angeles were recruited through civil service, 
not by the judges.) Other reasons for the high trial rate in Los Angeles are discussed in 
the text below. 
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in plea bargaining, which allowed them to "reward" with ex-
tremely lenient bargains or even a complete nolle prosequi defen-
dants against whom there was a legally defective case. 
Furthermore, the results of plea bargaining in Connecticut 
seem to vary according to the interpersonal dynamics and strate-
gies involved in the negotiations more than in Los Angeles. Prose-
cutors in Los Angeles, because they were constrained by office 
policies, could not respond as easily to a defense attorney's 
"hustling," wheeling and dealing, or threat of jury trial. Threat-
ening to go to trial in Los Angeles did not often yield real conces-
sions; concessions were monitored by superiors in the District 
Attorney's office and depended on the facts in the case. Actually, 
the greater emphasis on the facts of a case in felony plea negotia-
tion in Los Angeles (on both the legal and extra-legal considera-
tions) may contrast only with circuit court negotiation in Con-
necticut. Data on plea negotiations in individual cases in Con-
necticut would facilitate comparison on this point. 
I hope that future research will concentrate on the quality of 
information used in bargaining and the determinants of case dis-
positions. Particularly, in the interest of reform, we should be less 
concerned with whether plea bargaining is implicit or explicit, 
whether it is over the charge or the sentence, and whether the 
judge or prosecutor dominates the process. We should care much 
more about the facts and criteria used in bargaining and about 
fairness and equality in the bargains that ensue. A discretionary 
justice system which routinely reduces the charge for a case with 
a certain set of facts has at least a common-sense fairness about 
it. But a system in which plea bargains depend on the bargaining 
skills of the defense attorney does not._ Research on the variation 
in both process and substance of case disposition will help us 
identify the factors which encourage or inhibit negotiation based 
on substantive justice. 
As we move toward comparative research on criminal case 
disposition, we need to examine closely the internal norms and 
operating assumptions which shape plea bargaining in each 
court. Heumann's book presents a thoughtful discussion of the 
underlying issues and an articulate challenge to the conventional 
analysis of plea bargaining. 
